A prescription for saving Iraq

U.S. power, under the right conditions, can restore hope of free, pivotal ally.

A prescription for saving Iraq, in the unlikely event Obama cares

Author
By Dan Calabrese


By this point maybe you buy the lazy political narrative that Iraq is a Bush/Cheney-sponsored disaster and it’s all because we went to war over a WMD lie. Democrats sold this narrative, the media bought it and the Republicans were too afraid to try to counter it.



The truth is that the surge President Bush ordered in 2007 worked, and put Iraq on a path to strategic and political stability that had things looking very promising by 2009 and 2010. You can argue whether it was worth the cost America paid in lives and resources, but we had an excellent chance at that point to secure a reliable U.S. ally from whom we could buy oil, and with whom we could work to counter the worst terror threats arising from the region.

Then something bad happened. Specifically, Barack Obama happened. The ultimate result of Democrats’ nearly decade-long campaign against the legitimacy of the Iraq campaign was to put Obama in the White House, and with him the notion that there was nothing worth doing in Iraq aside from simply getting out. He campaigned on that, he got elected in part on that, and damn it, that’s what he was going to do.



So when the Iraqi government sought to negotiate a status of forces agreement that would keep a U.S. military presence on the ground (which is no big deal, as we have such agreements with more than 100 nations), Obama refused. Using the issue of legal immunity for U.S. troops as an excuse - any skilled negotiator could have worked through that issue - Obama abandoned the idea of any U.S. presence whatsoever in Iraq, and pulled out.

The result has been a complete disaster. Mosul is now under complete control of the terrorists, and the Iraqi government is pleading with the U.S. to reconsider and bring back a military presence that can help Iraq fulfill the potential that looked so promising a mere four years ago. And yes, there are huge problems with the Iraqi government, but Kenneth M. Pollack of the Brookings Institution sees Iraq’s need for U.S. help as offering the potential for Obama to deploy leverage to both put down the terrorists and encourage needed government reforms.

Washington should provide the military support that Mr. Maliki desires—drone strikes, weapons, reconnaissance assets, targeting assistance, improved and expanded training for his forces, even manned airstrikes. But only if he and Iraq’s leading politicians agree to settle the deep sectarian conflicts that have brought the country to its present plight.

Iraq’s growing crisis is not due to the civil war in Syria or the infiltration of terrorist fighters from abroad. It is rather the fear that Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites have of each other. Each community feels that the others seek to oppress, if not massacre, it and will do so if given half a chance. They also fear a central government with unrestrained power, controlled by one of those communities—in other words, what the Maliki government has become.

Mr. Maliki has so successfully consolidated power—and used it to arbitrarily oust his political and sectarian rivals—that Iraq’s other communities, particularly the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds, are terrified of him and of the Shiite Arabs he leads. That is why the Kurds are increasingly pushing toward independence. That is why a Sunni populace that triumphantly evicted Salafi terrorists in 2007-08 is now grudgingly accepting them back. As long as that is the case, Iraq will be riven by civil war and terrorism.

So, in return for a big military aid package, the U.S. should insist on the following:

A constitutional amendment imposing a two-term limit on the presidency and prime ministership. (A third term for Mr. Maliki may have to be grandfathered in to get him to agree, but simply advertising to all Iraqis that he will not rule for life would be an important reassurance that Iraq is not drifting back into dictatorship.)

A law defining the powers and prerogatives of the defense and interior ministers, thereby limiting the ability of the prime minister to exercise those powers.

A law bringing the regional military commands under the ministry of defense chain of command, and thus preventing the prime minister from issuing orders to them directly.

Passage of a provincial-powers law that delegates significant powers of appointment and greater control of local security forces to the provincial governments.

A new national-unity government, including a leading Kurd as defense minister and a leading Sunni from one of the opposition parties as interior minister. A national-unity government will be unwieldy and ineffective, but right now it is probably necessary to persuade Iraq’s Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities not to abandon Iraq’s political process.

Allowing provinces to attempt to become federal regions, as specified in the Iraqi Constitution.
The biggest reach of all, but also the best thing for Iraq: a constitutional amendment that redefines Iraq’s executive authority, with security and foreign affairs under the president, and the economy and domestic politics under the prime minister.

This is a very well-conceived and excellent proposal for how the U.S. can use Iraq’s needs to push for the kinds of changes that can set Iraq back on a path to success. But none of it will go anywhere unless Obama can be bothered to care, and the prospects for that are not encouraging. As Pollack writes, “Doubtful—the

Obama administration seems to turn a blind eye toward Iraq no matter how bad things get. And Baghdad may refuse to surrender its iron grip over the political system.”

This is what happens when one political party decides to attack every aspect of a mission sheerly because it appears to be a good political strategy. The Democrats became so invested in the Iraq-as-disaster narrative, they can’t even conceive of the notion of trying to save it. The truth is that for all the difficulties we experienced in the Iraq War, Iraq was on a path to success before Obama rejected the status of forces agreement and pulled out entirely. I am not saying success was guaranteed or would have been easy, but the path to get there was clear.

But if Iraq had become a success, even under a Democrat administration, that would have contradicted a political narrative into which Democrats were simply too heavily invested. They couldn't bear the thought that Bush’s horrific military misadventure might ultimately have resulted in something good, even if they could take partial or full credit for the desirable outcome.

So despite the fact, as Pollack demonstrates here, that there remains an opportunity for the U.S. to help Iraq succeed, the U.S. will not do that. At least as long as Obama is president. Because Obama serves the agenda of the Democratic Party, not the agenda of American security or the stability of our allies. And he always has.